Russia Invades Ukraine 2022

[Soloist]

My sense was that the word “proxy” meant that the war was really between the US and Russia. Ukraine is just doing the US’s bidding. I never bought that.

The war has been between the US and Russia since the end of WW2 roughly with multiple faces in multiple nations. The cold war never ended, it slowed and increased depending on political movements.
Proxy is very applicable here as without US support, Ukraine would have fallen. EU support was a little slow on the uptake while American support was quicker. Now America is "withholding" support such as tactical data or munitions to manipulate Ukraine and EU is trying to hold it together.

Initially, the unrest in Ukraine's east was the proxy of Russia or directly Russian assets. As the war actually broke into a "hot war" Ukraine was then supported by western powers against Russia.

When we think of Allies, there are a few ways to think about them but make no mistake, the US is not allied with Ukraine. When Egypt was called upon to come defend Israel, that was an Ally.
When US was shoving weapons and support at England but not officially joining the war against Germany, effectively UK was the proxy America was using. When they actually entered the war, it was as an ally.

I wasn't aware of any comments Putin made over Ukraine being a proxy but if he argued that the US should do what he did with his proxy in Syria when the US threw CIA support the second time to their proxy, no one would listen.

Ally
Relationship: Formal, mutual, and often reciprocal

Commitment:
High, based on shared interests

Control: Shared decision-making and influence

Level of Involvement: Direct and active

Risk: Shared risk, but also shared benefit

Proxy
Relationship: Asymmetrical, less formal, and often one-sided

Commitment: Lower, based on strategic goals

Control: Uneven, with sponsor influencing, but proxy retaining some autonomy

Level of Involvement: Indirect and potentially less visible

Risk: Sponsor risks deniability and accountability

[Soloist]

But somebody has to make the Ukrainians understand that they can't get what they want here. Because Europe and the US have refused to actually enter into a hot war against Russian in support of Ukraine. So we are in the same stalemate that we have always been, and the best that Ukraine can probably hope for is for the war to stop with Russia keeping all of its gains.

NATO can provide enough air defenses to protect Ukraine from aerial assaults if they wanted to, without being involved in any killing. NATO could also keep Russia from gaining additional ground in Ukraine by establishing a no-fly no war zone on the 4/5ths of Ukraine that Russia does not yet control without entering active war with Russia. And the UN can continue to recognize Ukraine's full territory, even if it is currently occupied by Russia. And NATO can put full sanctions on Russia and its allies. All this could be done and the killing would basically cease. But Trump doesn't want to do this for whatever reasons.

Yes, Russia might occupy Ukraine for a long while under this arrangement, but it is a known fact that Russian leaders reverse the decisions of former leaders, years down the road.

Lets consider this for a moment as a real possibility. I'm going to use AI to assist as I don't know the details well enough but I suspect it.

Question: Lets say the UN voted on a no fly zone in Ukraine. Could Russia veto it preventing it from being implemented?

Yes.

In the UN system, enforcement measures like a no-fly zone can only be authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. That means the resolution would need at least 9 votes in favor and no vetoes from any of the five permanent members (P5): United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia.

Since Russia is one of the P5, it could (and almost certainly would) use its veto to block any Security Council resolution establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine.

Okay so now lets consider NATO

Question: What legal proceeding would have to happen for NATO to do it?

For NATO to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine, the process would be internal to NATO, not a legal proceeding in the sense of a court. Here’s how it would have to unfold:

North Atlantic Council (NAC) –
This is NATO’s top political decision-making body, where each member state is represented by its ambassador (or by heads of state/government in a summit).

The NAC makes decisions by consensus—meaning every member has to agree. There is no majority vote system.

So, a NATO-wide no-fly zone would require unanimous consent of all 32 members.

Legal Basis –

NATO would normally justify military operations under Article 5 (collective defense) or Article 4 (consultation when a member feels threatened).

But Ukraine is not a NATO member, so Article 5 doesn’t apply.

Instead, NATO would have to decide that intervening is necessary for regional stability, humanitarian reasons, or the collective security of members. The precedent is Kosovo in 1999, where NATO acted without UN approval, citing humanitarian intervention.

Operational Planning –

If consensus is reached, NATO’s Military Committee and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) would plan the rules of engagement, air patrols, and enforcement.

Member states would then contribute aircraft, personnel, and logistics.

National Approval Processes –

Each NATO member still has to follow its own domestic legal process for committing forces (e.g. parliamentary approval in Germany, presidential decision in the U.S., etc.).

This means even after consensus in the NAC, there could be delays or limits depending on national laws.

So in short:

No UN legal proceeding is needed, since NATO can act without UN authorization (though it’s controversial under international law).

The NAC must reach consensus, and then each member must clear its domestic legal hurdles for deploying forces.

Lets say the US did it without NATO, could we provide a no fly zone with our munitions?
Case in point: Iran and proxies launched an attack of 300-350 cruise missiles, drones and ballistic missiles. With 5 separate nations involved in shooting down those munitions (which Iran declared before launching and did not do a surprise attack) there still was several missiles that made it through.
The US has openly provided defensive systems to Israel and Israel has perhaps the best anti missile second only to America available.

For the US to do the same in Ukraine we would need at a minimum: support bases to launch fighter patrols, support bases for the anti air missile defense systems, likely around 5k boots on the ground to protect those dedicated assets and use them (we don't want to give the best to Ukraine and even if we could, they no longer have the man power to effectively use it)

Stopping Ballistic missiles has never been easy and given the short range, it would be nearly impossible for the US to do this without a major investment of military assets. For your consideration here is a compiling of it by chat GPT

Question: Lets say now that the US was to actively impose a no fly zone on Ukraine. What would it take to defend against drones, cruise missiles, fighters and ballistic missiles?

Short version: it would take a big, layered, 24/7 air-and-missile defense enterprise, not just jets “patrolling.” You’d need sensors, command/control, electronic warfare, fighters, ground-based SAMs, and (for ballistic missiles) dedicated BMD units. Here’s the practical stack.

1) Core prerequisites

Legal/political: White House order + Congressional funding; overflight/basing from Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary (at minimum). Clear ROE for (a) engaging Russian/Belarusian aircraft and missiles over Ukraine, and (b) whether you may strike launch platforms/integrated air defenses across the border (SEAD/DEAD).

C2/ISR: Continuous AWACS (E-3/E-7) orbits, space and ground radars, Link-16/Link-22, airborne battle management, and a NATO CAOC tasking cycle (likely Uedem/Torrejón).

Tankers: Large fleet of KC-135/KC-46 to keep CAPs on-station.

2) By threat type
A) Drones (Shahed-type, FPV, one-way UAVs)

Problem: numerous, slow/low, cheap.
Counter: emphasize electronic warfare + point/short-range fires over expensive missiles.

EW/Jamming: persistent wide-area jamming, spoofing, and detection networks inside Ukraine.

SHORAD/C-UAS: Avenger/Stinger, Gepard-like guns, C-RAM, APKWS/Prox-fuzed 30–57 mm, and NASAMS/IRIS-T for tougher targets.

Airborne: fighters can kill drones, but it’s cost-inefficient; use only when convenient under CAP.

B) Cruise missiles (Kh-101/555, Kalibr, etc.)

Problem: low-altitude, terrain-masking, often in salvos.
Counter: layered sensors + medium SAMs + fighters.

Sensors: AWACS look-down, aerostats where feasible, distributed ground-based 3D radars.

Shooters: NASAMS/IRIS-T/Patriot (GEM-T/PAC-3 MSE) inside Ukraine; fighters with AIM-120 under GCI.

Geometry: build overlapping engagement zones around cities, power nodes, and NFZ enforcement corridors.

C) Enemy fighters (Su-35/34/30, MiG-31)

Problem: long-range AAMs and ground-based SAM umbrellas from Russian territory.
Counter: air superiority + SEAD/DEAD.

CAPs: 24/7 fighter CAPs along all NFZ entry axes, plus escort packages for strikers/SEAD jets.

SEAD/DEAD: standoff weapons (JASSM-ER, MALD-J, HARM) to suppress S-300/400/350 radars that threaten NFZ aircraft. Without periodic suppression, CAPs will be forced far west.

AWACS+tankers: continuous orbits to control intercepts and extend time on station.

D) Ballistic missiles (Iskander-M, Kinžal, S-300 in surface role, SRBM/MRBM)

Problem: hardest to stop; short flight times, high speed, often salvoed.
Counter: Patriot PAC-3 MSE inside Ukraine for terminal defense; THAAD in Poland/Romania for upper-tier shots; cueing from space/over-the-horizon sensors. Aegis (ashore/afloat) helps only if geometry and treaties/straits access allow. Even then, expect leakers under saturation.

3) Notional force to keep a modest NFZ alive

(Back-of-the-envelope—order of magnitude, not a war plan.)

CAP coverage: Suppose 6 concurrent CAP stations to cover key corridors and react lanes. One 24/7 CAP typically needs 4–6 fighters + tanking; six stations ≈ 24–36 fighters “on the line”, implying ~90–120 fighters in theater (including spares, maintenance, surge).

AWACS: 2–3 aircraft airborne at all times, requiring a fleet of 6–8 (rotation/maintenance).

Tankers: ~12–20 tankers airborne to support CAPs/SEAD orbits; fleet requirement 40–60.

SEAD/strike: a standing package of ~24–36 fighters/EA with standoff munitions for periodic suppression.

Ground-based air defense in Ukraine: at least 6–10 medium/long-range batteries (e.g., Patriot/NASAMS/IRIS-T) plus dozens of SHORAD/C-UAS sites to protect cities, air corridors, and NFZ nodes.

BMD: 2–4 Patriot battalions forward (multiple batteries each) in Ukraine’s west/center, and THAAD batteries in Poland/Romania for cueing/upper-tier shots.

4) Sustainment & munitions

Missiles: large stocks of AIM-120, AIM-9X, PAC-3 MSE, GEM-T, AMRAAM-ER, IRIS-T SL, and standoff SEAD weapons. Cruise-missile defense will burn AMRAAM/NASAMS rapidly.

Attrition planning: drones/missiles are consumption warfare—you need continuous resupply of interceptors and drone-killers, not just aircraft.

EW & sensors: field and maintain hundreds of EW nodes, passive RF sensors, and radars; integrate with Ukrainian networks.

5) Basing & geography

Primary bases: eastern Poland, Romania, Slovakia; possibly Baltics for northern arcs.

Inside Ukraine? Deploying US SAMs or aircraft inside Ukraine improves coverage but raises escalation risk and increases force-protection burden (hardening, C-RAM, base defense).

Maritime: Black Sea access for US warships is constrained; don’t assume Aegis ships can sit off Odesa. (Ashore BMD in allied territory is more realistic.)

6) Escalation & ROE choices that drive difficulty

Can you engage launchers and SAMs inside Russia/Belarus? If no, expect repeated salvos and higher risk to CAPs. If yes, you need robust SEAD/long-range strike and cyber/EW—plus political will to absorb escalation.

Civil-military deconfliction: NFZ means denying Russian aircraft/UAVs over Ukraine; that’s a state-on-state conflict threshold.

7) Bottom line

A US-enforced NFZ over Ukraine against drones, cruise missiles, fighters, and ballistic missiles is feasible only with:

Unanimous allied basing/overflight,

Round-the-clock AWACS/tankers,

100+ fighters in theater,

Regular SEAD/DEAD,

Substantial ground-based air defenses (incl. Patriot) in/near Ukraine, and

Acceptance that ballistic-missile defense remains limited and salvos will occasionally leak through.

As I've told you before, its not going to happen and I've pointed out these things before but here is a much more involved lay out of the tactics. I'd say at least 90% of this is spot on.

6) Escalation & ROE choices that drive difficulty

Can you engage launchers and SAMs inside Russia/Belarus? If no, expect repeated salvos and higher risk to CAPs. If yes, you need robust SEAD/long-range strike and cyber/EW—plus political will to absorb escalation.

Civil-military deconfliction: NFZ means denying Russian aircraft/UAVs over Ukraine; that’s a state-on-state conflict threshold.

This right here is the biggest problem. The US is not wanting a hot war with Russia for multiple reasons.

[Soloist]

....
For Ukraine, there are examples of acting independently in ways the U.S. has not necessarily wanted:

• Ukrainian military operations that Washington reportedly advised against (e.g., certain deep strikes inside Russian territory).
  ....

....

That could be like when someone says something like "Don't you dare do so-and-so." - and then they wink.

I don’t think that was the case. One of the reasons why the Biden Administration limited the amount of support they gave Ukraine was that they were worried about the war escalating from a regional conflict to something a lot bigger. From what I’ve read, there wasn’t any winking going on.

While the US did eventually give Ukraine some of the equipment they wanted and eventually did allow them to attack Russia itself, the Biden Administration did hobble Ukraine’s ability to be more successful earlier on.

Countries make mistakes. Pres Biden at the time was likely advised under older views of Russia (which since have updated) and things like refusing to allow US weapons on Russian soil was an attempt to contain the threat while drain it. Obviously, they miscalculated Russia's willingness to drag it out and their timidity over US military equipment being used for long range strikes.
At this point, Ukraine's front lines are being instructed to hold fire and not be seen (5-10 men for every 3 Kilometers roughly) and relay information. The Russians have more then once sent individual soldiers through Ukrainian lines nearly succeeding in creating a breach and they may have just done so but fog of war is limiting data on the most recent attacks...

Bottom line, Ukraine no longer has the troops to defend its border and is shuffling 1-2 strike forces to attempt to counter penetration and this will work for a little while but 1... 1 key battle and their mobile defense force is gone. Then how do they push back these incursions?
Weapon systems are great, but they need manpower at this point not better guns. They need the guns too of course...

[Bootstrap]

Yes, Russia might occupy Ukraine for a long while under this arrangement, but it is a known fact that Russian leaders reverse the decisions of former leaders, years down the road.

Too bad they don't have you for a military advisor. You seem amazingly confident about your understanding of what can be done militarily and how Russia would respond.

Most people in this thread have that in common. I'm surprised Putin, Trump, and Zelensky don't rely on MennoNet more than they seem to. Or maybe they just don't want people to know.

[Soloist]

Yes, Russia might occupy Ukraine for a long while under this arrangement, but it is a known fact that Russian leaders reverse the decisions of former leaders, years down the road.

Too bad they don't have you for a military advisor. You seem amazingly confident about your understanding of what can be done militarily and how Russia would respond.

Most people in this thread have that in common. I'm surprised Putin, Trump, and Zelensky don't rely on MennoNet more than they seem to. Or maybe they just don't want people to know.

You go back to the beginning, I was just as wrong over Russian success predictions as anyone.

[Bootstrap]

Most people in this thread have that in common. I'm surprised Putin, Trump, and Zelensky don't rely on MennoNet more than they seem to. Or maybe they just don't want people to know.

You go back to the beginning, I was just as wrong over Russian success predictions as anyone.

So what are we doing when we exchange opinions in this thread? It's obviously not for their benefit. Who is it for? What kinds of discussion add value?

[Soloist]

Most people in this thread have that in common. I'm surprised Putin, Trump, and Zelensky don't rely on MennoNet more than they seem to. Or maybe they just don't want people to know.

You go back to the beginning, I was just as wrong over Russian success predictions as anyone.

So what are we doing when we exchange opinions in this thread? It's obviously not for their benefit. Who is it for? What kinds of discussion add value?

Perhaps it doesn’t add spiritual value, but I enjoy these discussions and military strategy in general.
Why do you discuss it?

[temporal1]

You go back to the beginning, I was just as wrong over Russian success predictions as anyone.

So what are we doing when we exchange opinions in this thread? It's obviously not for their benefit. Who is it for? What kinds of discussion add value?

Perhaps it doesn’t add spiritual value, but I enjoy these discussions and military strategy in general.
Why do you discuss it?

it’s a form of expression and extension of prayer. lives are at stake.

[Szdfan]

Most people in this thread have that in common. I'm surprised Putin, Trump, and Zelensky don't rely on MennoNet more than they seem to. Or maybe they just don't want people to know.

You go back to the beginning, I was just as wrong over Russian success predictions as anyone.

So what are we doing when we exchange opinions in this thread? It's obviously not for their benefit. Who is it for? What kinds of discussion add value?

The value is for us and for whatever we get out of discussion and argument. It is the same for every discussion on this forum.

[Ernie]

But somebody has to make the Ukrainians understand that they can't get what they want here. Because Europe and the US have refused to actually enter into a hot war against Russian in support of Ukraine. So we are in the same stalemate that we have always been, and the best that Ukraine can probably hope for is for the war to stop with Russia keeping all of its gains.

NATO can provide enough air defenses to protect Ukraine from aerial assaults if they wanted to, without being involved in any killing. NATO could also keep Russia from gaining additional ground in Ukraine by establishing a no-fly no war zone on the 4/5ths of Ukraine that Russia does not yet control without entering active war with Russia. And the UN can continue to recognize Ukraine's full territory, even if it is currently occupied by Russia. And NATO can put full sanctions on Russia and its allies. All this could be done and the killing would basically cease. But Trump doesn't want to do this for whatever reasons.

Yes, Russia might occupy Ukraine for a long while under this arrangement, but it is a known fact that Russian leaders reverse the decisions of former leaders, years down the road.

Lets consider this for a moment as a real possibility. I'm going to use AI to assist as I don't know the details well enough but I suspect it.

Question: Lets say the UN voted on a no fly zone in Ukraine. Could Russia veto it preventing it from being implemented?

I probably used the wrong term. I was thinking that Russia would likely agree to stop fighting in Ukraine if they would be allowed to occupy the area they already occupy and if extreme sanctions were put upon them and their allies. When I say no fly zone, I meant airspace. Russia has at times entered US airspace in the past, but the US did not shoot the planes down. Russia might not agree to stay out of the part of Ukraine that it does not currently control, but I think there is a good chance that it would if:
1. Extreme sanctions and tariffs were put on it and its allies. (something many in Congress are pushing for)
2. NATO would assure Russia that Ukraine will not join NATO. (individual countries can still make alliances with Ukraine without Ukraine joining NATO)

Russia considers the area they already control in Ukraine as theirs, and much of the rest of the world considers it Ukraine's.
I haven't heard any proposal yet from the West for allowing Russia to continue controlling its current occupied area (like they did with Crimea since 2014) without conceding the land to Russia.
The only proposals I've read about are...
1. Russia must fully withdrawal from Ukraine.
2. Ukraine might need to concede/ give some of its land to Russia

Why can't there be a middle ground for the time being until some future Russian ruler is more reasonable?

You all are correct that I am likely shortsighted, but I wonder why I am not hearing a middle-ground proposal.