By Land or by Sea: The US after WWII

[Bootstrap]

This system has broadly benefited the world’s people. Trading rules have minimized bottlenecks, reducing costs.

Okay tomorrow china puts sanctions on us restricting the export of chips and pharmaceutical products. How does framework fix this? How does the system benefit people and minimize the bottleneck that just occurred? I’m arguing that her entire system created the bottleneck.

I think this is the central issue you keep returning to. You are saying that the system Paine is defending creates fragile dependencies, and when those dependencies are weaponized, the costs are immediate and severe.

But here’s why I do not understand this criticism:

• A continental power dealing with fragile supply chains responds by manufacturing critical goods at home.
• A maritime power dealing with fragile supply chains also responds by manufacturing critical goods at home.

In other words, domestic production and redundancy seem like necessities no matter which strategic framework you’re operating in.

So I'm curious where you see the difference. Can you explain more?

[Bootstrap]

Countries vested in the maritime order are far richer than those that seek to undermine it. Even those intending to overturn this system have benefited from it. China, for instance, became rich only after it joined the maritime order when the Cold War ended. The Iranian and Russian economies are a fraction of what they could be if they followed international law and built institutions to protect their citizens instead of their dictators.

China became rich and Russia and Iran could be rich too if they follow international law and protected citizens?
Is she really using China as that example?

I think you have a point here.

China didn’t become rich because it suddenly embraced the full spirit of the rules-based order (rule of law, citizen protection, liberal institutions). It became rich because it played by enough of the rules, in enough places, for long enough, to be allowed into global trade and capital flows.

So “playing by the rules” here really means operating within the system without openly rejecting it, not full compliance or good faith.

But this is not something warfare can really solve. The only tools available here are incentives, pressure, diversification, and building an economy that is not overly dependent on China. That does not make China instantly do whatever we want either, but we do not get to control China.

And I still agree with Paine that operating within shared systems, even imperfectly, has historically produced better outcomes than rejecting them outright, and that once major powers stop pretending to play along, everyone is worse off.

It's not a perfect system. But I don't know of a better alternative.

[Bootstrap]

https://archive.org/details/youtube-qSTuahfAZf0

This is actually really interesting four minute clip of her talking. She basically is arguing that we can sanction China to keep them from attacking Taiwan or to give Taiwan back their freedom. It’s been edited so I’m not sure about the entire context.
But this leans even stronger into the point I’m making. What power do we have to sanction China?
Who is supplying who with resources? who will get hurt worse by sanctions on China?
Her solution so blindingly flawed that I’m surprised she doesn’t see it given her background.

I hear different things in this clip than you do.

I don’t think that clip is being summarized quite correctly.

I don't think she is saying we can easily sanction China and force them to do whatever we want. I don't think she thinks there's anything we can do to force China to do whatever we want. She is talking about sanctions as one tool in the toolbox that can help influence China.

She is not claiming sanctions would be painless. She's pretty clear that sanctions hurt everyone involved, something used only because open warfare would be far worse.

She’s not saying we control China or that sanctions guarantee outcomes. She’s saying that operating within shared systems gives some leverage, whereas abandoning those systems leaves even fewer options short of war.

She uses North and South Korea as an example to show that South Korea prospered by being part of the global economy while North Korea is one of the poorest countries on earth. But she also says quite clearly that modern China, like North Korea, may not always do what is in their best economic interest. Ego and power and irrational nationalism can get in the way of what is best for a country's economy. Not just in China.

So I agree that she does not provide a way for us to get China to do whatever we want. But I think that is far more power than the United States realistically has.

[Bootstrap]

If Paine is right, America’s interests now align with a maritime strategy, not a continental one. America benefits most when:

Seas are open and secure, allowing global trade to flow
Economic growth comes from commerce and innovation, not territorial control
Alliances and institutions reduce the need for constant military confrontation
Power is exercised by shaping systems, not dominating neighbors

This sounds like more "free trade and open borders are always good" type of thinking.

Regardless of whether or not that is right or wrong, the voters soundly rejected that. People don't want "free trade" and massive amounts of immigration - they want stable employment and jobs. They don't want every new job going to someone on a nonimmigrant H-1B visa, whilst they get laid off.

I think this post brings in a whole set of broader political grievances as if they were the subject of Paine’s article — and they really aren’t.

The article isn’t about free trade vs. protectionism, immigration, wage stagnation, the Washington Consensus, NATO expansion, or what voters want domestically. Paine isn’t addressing these things, and she isn’t defending them. Not in this article, at any rate. (I do not know much about anything else she has written.)

She’s asking a specific strategic question: when the U.S. acts in the world, does it try to get its way primarily through force and threats, or by working with others to set fair rules?

That’s a different axis than left vs. right or globalism vs. nationalism.

I did listen to the original article, and obviously I didn't think too much of it.

That’s fine, I expect people to have different opinions. But I think it's helpful to keep this thread about the things she is actually saying in the article.

[Soloist]

Okay tomorrow china puts sanctions on us restricting the export of chips and pharmaceutical products. How does framework fix this? How does the system benefit people and minimize the bottleneck that just occurred? I’m arguing that her entire system created the bottleneck.

I think this is the central issue you keep returning to. You are saying that the system Paine is defending creates fragile dependencies, and when those dependencies are weaponized, the costs are immediate and severe.

But here’s why I do not understand this criticism:

• A continental power dealing with fragile supply chains responds by manufacturing critical goods at home.
• A maritime power dealing with fragile supply chains also responds by manufacturing critical goods at home.

In other words, domestic production and redundancy seem like necessities no matter which strategic framework you’re operating in.

So I'm curious where you see the difference. Can you explain more?

Her system caused the dependency as businesses chase money. As industry dries up, gets shut down, the path to building those critical things gets worse and worse. The chips act for example was pointed to address this but its much too small and if China cut off those two resources tomorrow we would be facing the same existential crisis Japan faced pre world war 2.


Can you sanction China to prevent or deal with this? no but China holds a major advantage over us in those two areas specifically and it would take 10-20 years to rectify this and would cost much more then just importing them from China.

Her system directly builds on a global economy, chasing the $ while a continental power either builds it themselves already or has "submitted" to an industrial power. She completely ignores these strategic implications yet she is very aware of these things but is ignoring them.

I think you are missing the point of how she is tying global trade to Maritime powers and economic flourishing, which causes the problems we have now.

This is what Claude adds

Continental powers: Default to autarky/self-sufficiency because they DON'T trust trade/Maritime powers
Paine's maritime system: Actively DISMANTLED self-sufficiency in favor of "efficient" global supply chains

and
"The difference is: a continental power WOULDN'T HAVE offshored chip production to a rival in the first place. Paine's maritime/free-trade ideology said 'comparative advantage good, global supply chains efficient' - which CAUSED the dependency. Now she wants to sanction the country that makes what we need. That's like Japan sanctioning the U.S. for oil in 1941 - economically suicidal. Her framework created the vulnerability it now claims to solve."

[Soloist]

But this is not something warfare can really solve. The only tools available here are incentives, pressure, diversification, and building an economy that is not overly dependent on China. That does not make China instantly do whatever we want either, but we do not get to control China.

And I still agree with Paine that operating within shared systems, even imperfectly, has historically produced better outcomes than rejecting them outright, and that once major powers stop pretending to play along, everyone is worse off.

It's not a perfect system. But I don't know of a better alternative.

This isn't her primary point though. She is advocating for a very specific framework. Not just a shared system. She is connecting it to wealth and stability yet I pointed out her historical examples are flawed and misleading, her conclusions don't account for industrial capability nor the poverty it directly causes. She's using this whole thing to endorse past US action and bash current US action. Even if she has a point about what the US is doing now, her entire argument is based on faulty logic and misleading if not outright fake historical cherrypicking.

[Soloist]

https://archive.org/details/youtube-qSTuahfAZf0

This is actually really interesting four minute clip of her talking. She basically is arguing that we can sanction China to keep them from attacking Taiwan or to give Taiwan back their freedom. It’s been edited so I’m not sure about the entire context.
But this leans even stronger into the point I’m making. What power do we have to sanction China?
Who is supplying who with resources? who will get hurt worse by sanctions on China?
Her solution so blindingly flawed that I’m surprised she doesn’t see it given her background.

I hear different things in this clip than you do.

I don’t think that clip is being summarized quite correctly.

I don't think she is saying we can easily sanction China and force them to do whatever we want. I don't think she thinks there's anything we can do to force China to do whatever we want. She is talking about sanctions as one tool in the toolbox that can help influence China.

She is not claiming sanctions would be painless. She's pretty clear that sanctions hurt everyone involved, something used only because open warfare would be far worse.

She’s not saying we control China or that sanctions guarantee outcomes. She’s saying that operating within shared systems gives some leverage, whereas abandoning those systems leaves even fewer options short of war.

She uses North and South Korea as an example to show that South Korea prospered by being part of the global economy while North Korea is one of the poorest countries on earth. But she also says quite clearly that modern China, like North Korea, may not always do what is in their best economic interest. Ego and power and irrational nationalism can get in the way of what is best for a country's economy. Not just in China.

So I agree that she does not provide a way for us to get China to do whatever we want. But I think that is far more power than the United States realistically has.

I disagree with your perspective on what she said. She specifically tied sanctions to forcing China to give up Taiwan. Either way, this wasn't the main discussion, more of side nuance.

Ah. The global order, going back full circle, is based on sovereignty. If you allow this, it doesn't mean you have to go to a nuclear war. You just never recognize whatever it is and then you sanction China from then until kingdom come, so that they are not part of the maritime trading order. And you tell them they need to cough up Taiwan.

[JohnH]

She’s asking a specific strategic question: when the U.S. acts in the world, does it try to get its way primarily through force and threats, or by working with others to set fair rules?

And then who enforces that set of "fair rules"?

[Soloist]

She’s asking a specific strategic question: when the U.S. acts in the world, does it try to get its way primarily through force and threats, or by working with others to set fair rules?

And then who enforces that set of "fair rules"?

The imaginary adult with nukes.

[Bootstrap]

This isn't her primary point though. She is advocating for a very specific framework. Not just a shared system. She is connecting it to wealth and stability yet I pointed out her historical examples are flawed and misleading, her conclusions don't account for industrial capability nor the poverty it directly causes. She's using this whole thing to endorse past US action and bash current US action. Even if she has a point about what the US is doing now, her entire argument is based on faulty logic and misleading if not outright fake historical cherrypicking.

There are a lot of strong adjectives here, but I do think the United States became wealthy and powerful in the 1940s and 1950s largely by doing exactly what she’s describing. Many people see that period as an economic golden era and a time when U.S. leadership was at its strongest.

That doesn’t mean everything the United States has done in the past was good. I would certainly argue that Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan were mistakes—and my sense is that she would probably agree with that, even if she might frame it differently.