By Land or by Sea: The US after WWII

[Soloist]

Oh, I am, but I think you completely dismissed my point and concluded the entire premise I had about her article was wrong and then proposed exactly the opposite of what she’s actually advocating for.

Perhaps we can rewind a bit, because I don’t think that’s what I was trying to do.

Let me ask this directly, since it seems to be the core of our disagreement: Do you dismiss Paine’s central premise about maritime vs. land-based power? Do you think that distinction is a centrally important one or not?

In today’s world, her clear cut distinctions are not accurate. That’s not really the point though you can argue her point based off of other merits which namely what you’re picking out is the cooperation.

My sense was that you were largely setting it aside and focusing on criticizing her policy conclusions, without really taking a position on the underlying framework itself. If you reject the framework, that’s fine, but I think it would help the discussion to be clear about whether that core distinction is something you think is useful or not.

I don’t really care about her policy conclusions. I was addressing the framework and pointing out how deeply flawed it was.

Second, do you disagree that cooperative systems are generally better than war for everyone involved?

It depends on if the cooperative system is one of the nation she gave an example of because all of those nations were very aggressive and territorial despite being the era of trade and cooperation.
Cooperative systems breakdown if they don’t understand where another person is coming from, and if one child owns all the toys, he can choose to pack them up and go home and then the child in the sandbox is left with no toys then an adult has to step in and force sharing. In my system, I’m talking about where I identify the flaws she has there is no adult that will step in and we’re talking about things that will cost global conflicts. Brittain an example she references was losing World War II because it had no production power. They were outclassed by Germany in numerous ways.

I’m not saying they’re perfect, neutral, or cost-free. But I am saying that systems built around cooperation tend to produce better outcomes than repeated territorial conflict and warfare.

But that’s not what she’s arguing.
That’s a different argument entirely

[Soloist]

Actually, I think Claude is creating the straw man here.

Claude changes the focus from what Paine is actually arguing (maritime vs. land-based power as a strategic framework) to a different discussion about specific vulnerabilities like chips, pharma, and production shifts — and then treats that as if it were the main subject of the article.

Once that shift happens, the original topic gets dismissed as inadequate or irrelevant.

Those vulnerabilities are important, and they’re fair ways to test or apply her framework. But they aren’t what the article is centrally about. So criticizing the article for not directly explaining them feels less like refuting her argument and more like changing the question being asked.

Claude
**He’s wrong. Here’s why:**

**Paine explicitly makes this about current vulnerabilities and policy.**

From her article:

- “Today’s competition is just the latest iteration of the continental-maritime conflict”
- She’s arguing the U.S. must continue current policies or face “catastrophe”
- She warns against “erecting barriers” and tariffs
- She advocates sanctions as the main tool against China/Russia

**She’s not writing abstract theory - she’s prescribing policy for current threats.**

**When she says:**

- “China is even more reliant on trade and imports than Germany was”
- “Economic bottlenecks from shutdown of its oceanic trade would debilitate its economy”

**She’s claiming maritime blockade gives us leverage over China.**

**Your response - “But they make chips/pharma we need” - directly refutes her strategic assessment.**

**That’s not changing the subject. That’s testing her claim against reality.**

**He’s saying:** “She’s just describing a framework”

**She’s actually saying:** “This framework explains current competition AND justifies these specific policies”

**You’re showing:** “Her framework misidentifies who has leverage”

**If her framework can’t handle the most important dependencies in a U.S.-China confrontation, it’s not fit for purpose.**

That’s not a straw man - that’s showing her analysis fails where it matters most.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[Soloist]

I pointed out a flaw in her assumption that is deep and central completely demolishing the entire foundation that she tries to build.

Help me understand that part. I missed it, possibly in the volume of Claude output.

What is the specific assumption you think is deep and central, and how does it completely demolish the foundation of her argument?

Reread her article and reread the post you’re quoting.

[Bootstrap]

Second, do you disagree that cooperative systems are generally better than war for everyone involved?

It depends on if the cooperative system is one of the nation she gave an example of because all of those nations were very aggressive and territorial despite being the era of trade and cooperation.
Cooperative systems breakdown if they don’t understand where another person is coming from, and if one child owns all the toys, he can choose to pack them up and go home and then the child in the sandbox is left with no toys then an adult has to step in and force sharing. In my system, I’m talking about where I identify the flaws she has there is no adult that will step in and we’re talking about things that will cost global conflicts. Brittain an example she references was losing World War II because it had no production power. They were outclassed by Germany in numerous ways.

You’re right that Paine is more black-and-white than the historical record really allows. Britain, the U.S., and other maritime powers have also been aggressive, coercive, and territorial. Trade and cooperation often existed alongside imperial domination, not instead of it. No country has ever been purely “cooperative.”

I also agree with your “child with all the toys” analogy. Cooperative systems only really work when power is relatively balanced, or when there’s some enforcing authority. And you’re right: there is no global “adult,” no world government that can force everyone to play fair. This was actually one of the reasons for founding the United Nations and many other institutions, but that was more than these institutions can accomplish. Or perhaps we need something to replace them? Or ways to reform them and give them teeth?

I also see how this connects directly to your points about chips, pharma, and supply chains. When cooperation breaks down, the costs are existential. COVID made that painfully clear. Protecting ourselves with domestic production of critical goods is important.

Where I think we may still differ is here:

I’m not saying they’re perfect, neutral, or cost-free. But I am saying that systems built around cooperation tend to produce better outcomes than repeated territorial conflict and warfare.

But that’s not what she’s arguing.
That’s a different argument entirely

I think she is arguing that, but I could be wrong. Regardless, I would argue that. To me, this is what she is saying in sections like this one:

This system has broadly benefited the world’s people. Trading rules have minimized bottlenecks, reducing costs. Safe, open seas facilitate economic growth, raising living standards. People can travel, work, and invest abroad. Billionaires are the greatest beneficiaries of the maritime order because they have the most to lose to confiscation when the rules disappear, and because their economic interests are global. Countries vested in the maritime order are far richer than those that seek to undermine it. Even those intending to overturn this system have benefited from it. China, for instance, became rich only after it joined the maritime order when the Cold War ended. The Iranian and Russian economies are a fraction of what they could be if they followed international law and built institutions to protect their citizens instead of their dictators.

[Soloist]

This system has broadly benefited the world’s people. Trading rules have minimized bottlenecks, reducing costs.

Okay tomorrow china puts sanctions on us restricting the export of chips and pharmaceutical products. How does framework fix this? How does the system benefit people and minimize the bottleneck that just occurred? I’m arguing that her entire system created the bottleneck.

Safe, open seas facilitate economic growth, raising living standards. People can travel, work, and invest abroad. Billionaires are the greatest beneficiaries of the maritime order because they have the most to lose to confiscation when the rules disappear, and because their economic interests are global.

these billionaires have a tendency to lose their assets when their country starts trading barbs with another as those other countries find it convenient to ignore rule of law when it’s about an opponent. Living standards raise in some areas and drop in others. Economic growth is generally founded on the back of someone else.

Countries vested in the maritime order are far richer than those that seek to undermine it. Even those intending to overturn this system have benefited from it. China, for instance, became rich only after it joined the maritime order when the Cold War ended. The Iranian and Russian economies are a fraction of what they could be if they followed international law and built institutions to protect their citizens instead of their dictators.

China became rich and Russia and Iran could be rich too if they follow international law and protected citizens?
Is she really using China as that example?

[Bootstrap]

Thanks - I think I can now follow what you are saying. More tomorrow, I have used up my MN time for today.

[Soloist]

https://archive.org/details/youtube-qSTuahfAZf0

This is actually really interesting four minute clip of her talking. She basically is arguing that we can sanction China to keep them from attacking Taiwan or to give Taiwan back their freedom. It’s been edited so I’m not sure about the entire context.
But this leans even stronger into the point I’m making. What power do we have to sanction China?
Who is supplying who with resources? who will get hurt worse by sanctions on China?
Her solution so blindingly flawed that I’m surprised she doesn’t see it given her background.

[R7ehr]

Sarah Paine is Americas reassurance provider.

[Soloist]

https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/vi ... monographs

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/v ... ort-papers

These are both useful to understand some of her pre-political views and Japan's lead up to WW2

[JohnH]

If Paine is right, America’s interests now align with a maritime strategy, not a continental one. America benefits most when:

Seas are open and secure, allowing global trade to flow
Economic growth comes from commerce and innovation, not territorial control
Alliances and institutions reduce the need for constant military confrontation
Power is exercised by shaping systems, not dominating neighbors

This sounds like more "free trade and open borders are always good" type of thinking.

Regardless of whether or not that is right or wrong, the voters soundly rejected that. People don't want "free trade" and massive amounts of immigration - they want stable employment and jobs. They don't want every new job going to someone on a nonimmigrant H-1B visa, whilst they get laid off.

There are also other assumptions here such as that "economic growth" is always good. I would say that is a very big assumption. There has been a massive amount of economic growth, but very little of that has flowed to ordinary Americans in the last few decades. Most of it just flows to the wealthy, who become even wealthier. People want "economic stability" instead.

"Alliances and institutions" don't seem to have delivered on their promise, either. NATO seemed to function as an institution that demanded America get heavily involved in a war with Russia.

I would say that most Americans aren't interested in us being a "continental power", either. The general wish is for America to stop being so interventionist at all, and instead focus more on things at home and in our immediate sphere of influence - like the Caribbean. People want stable jobs, a stable economy, and no more wild adventures in random likes like Afghanistan and Iraq fighting for vaguely defined goals. People want meth and fentanyl to stop flooding communities of the most vulnerable. People are tired of hearing about how "economic growth" and "free trade" are moral goods when all it ever leads to is plant closings, layoffs, and the prices for consumer goods still inevitably go up.

Since we live in a democracy, the voters have decided that's what they want - the Washington Consensus is dead. The neoconservatives stopped winning elections. Your choices are either a leftist vision as embodied by Mamdani or a Trumpist evnsion as embodied by Trump. It is instructive to learn about just how much both of those visions have in common when compared against the Washington Consensus or neoconservatism.

(I did listen to the original article, and obviously I didn't think too much of it. In particular, she doesn't address the rather big problem of when in a democracy, the voters reject being either a continental or a maritime power.)